We consider complexity issues for a special type of combinatorial auctions, the single-minded auction, where every agent is interested in only one subset of the commodities.
Introduction
The combinatorial auctions problem has attracted much attention in recent years because of its applications to various interesting problems [6, 17, 24] . In that model, participating agents have preferences not only for particular item of commodities, but also for all possible bundles. There is, however, an inherent difficulty in applying computational complexity to obtain meaningful results for this model: The value function v of each agent is defined on 2 m subsets, exponential in the number m of commodities. That is very similar to a situation in the complexity study of cooperative game theory where it was proposed to consider value functions implicitly described with a number of parameters polynomial in m [21] . Such a paradigm has turned complexity into a Mamer [3] (and even ours in Section 5) reveals a relationship between the Walrasian equilibrium and the optimal allocation if Walrasian equilibrium indeed exists. Therefore, there is a probable link between deciding the existence of Walrasian equilibrium and finding the optimal allocation. Our proof of the NP-hardness of the Walrasian equilibrium confirms that.
Finally, we explore the duality relationship for single-minded auction, with its complexity issues in mind. Duality has played a crucial role in many important aspects in economics. Algorithmic design for market equilibrium by Devanur et al. [10] depends on an important duality relations for the prices of commodities and the assets of individual agents. Linear program duality has also been a fruitful tool in cooperative game theory. Literatures dealing with the non-emptiness of the core often result in a statement that an integer program and its corresponding linear program relaxation have the same optimal value, such as the assignment game [25] , the cost allocation game on trees [27] , the partition game [11] , the combinatorial optimization game [7] and the facility location game [13] .
In Section 5, we exploit such a duality relationship. Note that the linear program approach established by Bikhchandani and Mamer [3] is exponential in the input size. Thus it is not suitable for our algorithmic study. We establish a formulation that is of polynomial size.
We conclude our work in Section 6 with remarks and discussions on future research. In this paper, we consider the case that all buyers are restricted to be single-minded, and denote A ¼ ðO; O 1 ; v 1 ; y; O n ; v n Þ as a single-minded auction [18] . Let type matrix M ¼ ½a j;i mÂn ; where a j;i AN,f0g is the number of o j contained in the bundle O i : Unless stated otherwise, v i denotes the value v i ðO i Þ throughout the paper.
The model
When receiving the submitted tuple ðO i ; v i Þ from each buyer i (the input), the auctioneer specifies the following two parts as the output of the auction:
* Allocation vector X ¼ ðX 1 ; y; X n Þ of O to all buyers, where X i represents the collection of commodities allocated to buyer O i :
n Þ is said to be an optimal allocation if for any allocation X ; we have
That is, X Ã maximizes total valuations of buyers. Let X 0 ¼ O\ð S n i¼1 X i Þ be the set of commodities that are not allocated to any buyers. * Price vector ðpðo 1 Þ; y; pðo m ÞÞ (or ðp 1 ; y; p m Þ). In this paper, we assume the prices of the commodities are linear, i.e., pðBCÞ ¼ pðBÞ þ pðCÞ; for any B; CDO:
If O i wins bundle B; his (quasi-linear) utility is u i ðB; pÞ ¼ v i ðBÞ À pðBÞ: For any non-trading buyer, his utility is zero.
Communication complexity
In this section, we study the communication complexity issues in single-minded auction. For convenience, here we assume that
Following a model in [23] , we are interested in the number of bits for the buyers to convey their subsets of interests to the auctioneer. Here, the communication cost is referred to the criteria of Yao [28] , i.e., the total number of bits that all buyers transmit to the auctioneer. The upper bound is obviously OðmnÞ: Our focus here is thus the proof of the matching lower bound. We study a special case of single-minded auction, and demonstrate the lower bound of communication complexity for this special case is OðmnÞ; which implies the same lower bound for the general problem. Specifically, we consider the following single-minded auction:
* There are 2n independent buyers bidding for 2m commodities. For any 1pip2n; assume the basic bundle O i of buyer O i contains exactly m various commodities (i.e., jO i j ¼ m), and v i ðO i Þ ¼ 1: * In terms of the deterministic auction protocol, the auctioneer determines whether there exists the (optimal) allocation ðX 1 ; y; X 2n Þ such that P 2n i¼1 v i ðX i Þ ¼ 2: That is, whether there exist There are 2n players, each holds an integer x i Af1; 2; y; 2Mg; they want to evaluate a 2n-argument function 
If f ðx 1 ; y; x n ; x nþ1 ; y; x 2n Þ ¼ 1; i.e., there exist 1piojp2n such that x i þ x j ¼ 2M þ 1: From the above arguments, there must be x i Afx 1 ; y; x n g; and x j Afx nþ1 ; y; x 2n g: Therefore, we have
For any protocol P that computes f ðx 1 ; y; x n ; x nþ1 ; y; x 2n Þ; Alice and Bob can simulate it stepby-step. In each step, if player iAf1; y; ng does some computation and broadcasts a bit a; then we let Alice compute it and send the same bit a to Bob and the auctioneer (Alice knows all information that player i knows, so he can simulate the computation player i does). If player jAfn þ 1; y; 2ng does some computation and broadcasts a bit b; then let Bob compute and send the same bit b to Alice and the auctioneer (Bob knows all information that player j knows, so he can simulate player j's computation). At the end of the protocol, both players get the value of f ðx 1 ; y; x n ; x nþ1 ; y; x 2n Þ; so does the auctioneer. That means protocol P can be used to computing DISJ where the last equality holds when log 2nocm for some constant cAð0; 2Þ: That is, in the worst case, the communication complexity is lower bounded by OðmnÞ: Hence we get the following conclusion.
Theorem 3.1. For any single-minded auction, the communication complexity that computes the optimal allocation is YðmnÞ:
Complexity of Walrasian equilibrium
In this section, we study the computational complexity of Walrasian equilibrium in singleminded auction. Intuitively, Walrasian equilibrium specifies the allocation and price vector such that any remaining commodity is priced at zero and all buyers are satisfied with their corresponding allocations under the given price vector. Formally, Definition 4.1 (Walrasian Equilibrium for Unit-Item Auction Gul and Stacchetti [14] ). A Walrasian equilibrium of single-minded auction A ¼ ðO;
is a tuple ðX ; pÞ; where X ¼ ðX 1 ; y; X n Þ is an allocation vector, pX0 is a price vector, such that (i) pðX 0 Þ ¼ 0; where X 0 ¼ O\ð S n i¼1 X i Þ and (ii) for any buyer O i ; u i ðX i ; pÞXu i ðB; pÞ; for all BDO:
For the auction with multiple items of the same type of commodity, let f ðo j ; X Þ be the number of o j allocated to buyers in allocation X : Therefore we must have f ðo j ; X Þpd j : 1 ; o 3 g; respectively, at valuation 3,2,2. We only consider the optimal allocation here, i.e., assigning fo 1 ; o 2 g to buyer O 1 : Hence, the equilibrium price vector p should satisfy pðo 1 o 2 Þp3; pðo 2 o 3 Þ; pðo 1 o 3 ÞX2; and pðo 3 Þ ¼ 0; which cannot be held simultaneously. Therefore the Walrasian equilibrium does not exist.
Note that our value function is defined in a special way for our algorithmic study, different from the standard weakly increasing assumption under which the value of any bundle B for buyer O i is at least v i if O i DB: Therefore, the input size of our model is polynomially bounded by the number of commodities and buyers. That allows us to deal with the computational complexity issues with ease. Theorem 4.1. Given any single-minded auction, it is NP-hard to determine whether Walrasian equilibrium exists.
Proof. We reduce from EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS (X3C) [12] . That is, given a family S ¼ ðs 1 ; y; s n Þ of 3-subsets of N ¼ f1; y; 3mg; we are asked whether there is a subfamily of m sets of S covering all elements in N:
For the above input of X3C, we construct the following auction with 3m þ 3 commodities (with unit quantity each) and 9m þ n þ 1 buyers: Let every element of N correspond to a commodity, i.e., O 0 ¼ fo 1 ; y; o 3m g: We add another three special commodities a; b; g; let s nþ1 ¼ fa; b; gg and
The first n þ 1 buyers' valuation functions are defined as follows:
where s i denotes the set of corresponding commodities. That is, s i is the basic bundle of buyer O i ; 1pirn þ 1: Let O 0 ¼ fO 1 ; y; O n g be the set of first n buyers. For any 3-collection C ¼ ff 1 ; f 2 ; og; where f 1 ; f 2 As nþ1 ; f 1 af 2 ; and oAO 0 ; we add one buyer with C as the basic bundle at valuation 3. Note that the number of such 3-collections is 9m; therefore we just added 9m new buyers.
If there exists a subfamily of m sets fs i 1 ; y; s i m gDS covering all elements in N; we may allocate s nþ1 to buyer O nþ1 ; and s i k to buyer O k ; for 1pkpm: Hence when we set the price of each commodity is one, all buyers are satisfied with their corresponding allocations, and then the equilibrium exists.
Conversely, assume M has an equilibrium ððX 1 ; y; X nþ1 ; X 0 Þ; pÞ; where X 0 is the vector of allocations to buyers except O 1 ; y; O nþ1 : We only need to show that the above equilibrium must be allocating all commodities of O 0 to buyers in O 0 ; that is, m different buyers in O 0 win with three elements each, which constructs a 3-sets cover. Otherwise, at least three elements of O 0 are not allocated to any buyer in O 0 : With a change of notations, we may assume that such three elements are fo 1 ; o 2 ; o 3 g: There are the following various cases:
(1) All items in s nþ1 are bought by O nþ1 : Then, none of items fo 1 ; o 2 ; o 3 g can be bought by anyone. They will all be priced at zero. However, at least one of the items in fa; b; gg must be priced at least 1. Assume, w.l.o.g., it to be a: Then the buyer interested in fb; g; o 1 g would be able to buy the bundle at a price no more than 2; a contradiction to the definition of Walrasian equilibrium. (2) Some but not all items in s nþ1 are bought by some buyer. Without loss of generality, assume that it is bought by a buyer who is interested in fa; b; o i g for some o i AO 0 ; ia1: At least one of a and b must be priced at no more than 3=2; and assume, w.l.o.g., pðaÞp3=2: Then no one could buy g and it must be priced at zero. The buyer interested in fa; g; o 1 g would be able to buy the bundle at a price no more than 3=2: A contradiction. (3) No items in s nþ1 is bought by some buyer. This is not possible since all will be priced at zero and buyer O nþ1 would be able to buy his interested bundle fa; b; gg at a null price, a contradiction.
In conclusion, no matter how we allocate the commodities in s nþ1 ; there always exists a buyer whose utility is not maximized for his allocation, which contradicts the definition of Walrasian equilibrium. & Furthermore, given any solution of allocation and price vector, it's not hard to see that we can check if it is a Walrasian equilibrium in polynomial time. Hence, the problem of computing Walrasian equilibrium in single-minded auction is NP-complete. As for the general combinatorial auctions, we need exponential steps to check if all buyers are satisfied with their allocations.
Polynomial size duality theorem for Walrasian equilibrium
The following lemma is on the relation between Walrasian equilibrium and optimal allocation. Lemma 5.1. If ðX ; pÞ is a Walrasian equilibrium, then X must be an optimal allocation.
Proof. We need to prove that for any allocation
Denote the number of commodity w j in bundle B by n j ðBÞ: From the definition of Walrasian equilibrium, we know that
Hence for all buyers, we have:
Note that for 8j; f ðo j ; X Þpd j ; and
Otherwise commodity o j is not clear in allocation X : Since ðX ; pÞ is a Walrasian equilibrium, due to the condition (i) of Walrasian equilibrium, we have pðo j Þ ¼ 0; which implies that pðo j Þðf ðo j ; X Þ À f ðo j ; Y ÞÞ ¼ 0:
Hence we always have P 
Due to the complementary slackness condition, we have
Now we construct an allocation as follows: If 
From the above conditions, ðX ; pÞ is a Walrasian equilibrium. ): Assume a Walrasian equilibrium ðX ; pÞ exists. Let
We following construct vector y Ã ¼ ðy
From the above construction, it is clear that for all 1pipn;
X m j¼1 a j;i y
Hence y Ã ; z Ã is DLPR feasible. Then,
Similarly, we have x
Combining (5), (6) , and (7), we have M LPR ¼ M DLPR pM IP : That is, M IP ¼ M LPR : &
Conclusion and discussions
In this work, we consider algorithm and complexity issues of Walrasian equilibrium for single-minded auction. Our communication complexity result is the first non-trivial matching bound in communication complexity of computational economics. The reduction technique for NP-hard proof of Walrasian equilibrium may be useful in related equilibrium problems.
A polynomial size duality theorem for single-minded auction is established. In comparison, that of Bikhchandani and Mamer [3] for combinatorial auctions (and their version for single-minded auction) is of exponential size, and thus not suitable for the study of complexity issues. Our discussion is specified to single-minded buyers, what happens if buyers are, for example, kminded?
Because Walrasian equilibrium does not necessarily exist, we may consider relaxed Walrasian equilibrium, in which we only require condition (i) of Definition 4.2 (i.e., if the commodity is not clear, its price is zero). Trivially, relaxed Walrasian equilibrium always exists. Here, for any singleminded auction, we are asked to select a relaxed Walrasian equilibrium ðX ; pÞ to maximize d Á n; 0odp1; the number of satisfied buyers, where buyer O i is satisfied if his utility is maximized by the corresponding allocation X i under price vector p:
Note that the ordinary Walrasian equilibrium is equivalent to the case d ¼ 1: In Example 4.1, d ¼ 2=3: Thus, there is an instance such that the number of satisfied buyers is at most 2n=3: Specifically, we have the following conjecture.
Conjecture. For any single-minded auction, dX2=3; and then, the bound d ¼ 2=3 is tight. That is, there always exists relaxed Walrasian equilibrium ðX ; pÞ such that there are at least 2n=3 satisfied buyers under ðX ; pÞ:
